mechanism design

On the Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism in Bilateral Trade
We study the problem of social welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where two agents, a buyer and a seller, trade an indivisible …
PDF arxiv
Computing Simple Mechanisms: Lift-and-Round over Marginal Reduced Forms
We study revenue maximization in multi-item multi-bidder auctions under the natural item-independence assumption – a classical …
PDF DOI arxiv
Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design
Machine learning has developed a variety of tools for learning and representing high-dimensional distributions with structure. Recent …
PDF DOI arxiv
On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items
We study the problem of sellingnheterogeneous items to a single buyer, whose values fordifferent items aredependent. Under arbitrary …
PDF DOI arXiv
A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai, …
PDF DOI
How to Sell Information Optimally: An Algorithmic Study
We investigate the algorithmic problem of selling information to agents who face a decision-making problem under uncertainty. We adopt …
PDF DOI arXiv
Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms
Motivated by the growing prominence of third-party data providers in online marketplaces, this paper studies the impact of the presence …
PDF DOI arXiv
Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms
Motivated by the growing prominence of third-party data providers in online marketplaces, this paper studies the impact of the presence …
PDF DOI
Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design
PDF DOI
Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. …
PDF DOI arXiv