Latest

• On Tractable Φ-Equilibria in Non-Concave Games
• Fast Last-Iterate Convergence of Learning in Games Requires Forgetful Algorithms
• Provable Partially Observable Reinforcement Learning with Privileged Information
• Accelerated Algorithms for Constrained Nonconvex-Nonconcave Min-Max Optimization and Comonotone Inclusion
• Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions
• The Power of Two-sided Recruitment in Two-sided Markets
• User Response in Ad Auctions: An MDP Formulation of Long-Term Revenue Optimization
• Near-Optimal Policy Optimization for Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games
• Uncoupled and Convergent Learning in Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games with Bandit Feedback
• Simultaneous Auctions are Approximately Revenue-Optimal for Subadditive Bidders
• Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Monotone Games
• Nearly Optimal Committee Selection For Bias Minimization
• On the Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism in Bilateral Trade
• Accelerated Single-Call Methods for Constrained Min-Max Optimization
• Finite-Time Last-Iterate Convergence for Learning in Multi-Player Games
• Accelerated Algorithms for Monotone Inclusions and Constrained Nonconvex-Nonconcave Min-Max Optimization
• Computing Simple Mechanisms: Lift-and-Round over Marginal Reduced Forms
• Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?
• Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design
• Tight Last-Iterate Convergence of the Extragradient and the Optimistic Gradient Descent-Ascent Algorithm for Constrained Monotone Variational Inequalities
• On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items
• A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
• An Efficient $\varepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation and Its Application to Black-Box Reduction in Revenue Maximization
• How to Sell Information Optimally: An Algorithmic Study
• On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization
• Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness
• Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms
• Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms
• Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities
• Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions
• The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade
• Learning Safe Policies with Expert Guidance
• A Constructive Approach to Reduced-Form Auctions with Applications to Multi-Item Mechanism Design
• Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples
• Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms
• Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
• Zero-Sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmax
• Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design
• On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
• Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
• Optimum Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources
• Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction
• Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity
• Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching
• Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design
• Mechanism design : a new algorithmic framework
• Designing Markets for Daily Deals
• Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations
• Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions
• Can Nondeterminism Help Complementation?
• Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization
• An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms
• Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing
• On optimal multidimensional mechanism design
• A Tight Lower Bound for Streett Complementation
• On Minmax Theorems for Multiplayer Games
• Tight Upper Bounds for Streett and Parity Complementation
• An Improved Lower Bound for the Complementation of Rabin Automata
• API hyperlinking via structural overlap